Khalid Yahya Blankinship
Khalid Yahya Blankinship is professor and department chair of religion at Temple University
More About this Author
Khalid Yahya Blankinship is professor and department chair of religion at Temple University
More About this Author
Khalid Yahya Blankinship is professor and department chair of religion at Temple University
More About this Author
Despite claims about the decline of nationalism in the globalizing age of instant mass communication, nationalism remains the primary organizing force that orders today’s human societies; indeed, it is now more manifested than ever all over the world. As such, we need to understand what it entails, how it affects us, and how to deal with it. Because every human being lives in close contact with the force of nationalism for their entire life, it is very difficult to perceive what it is in full—we are too close to it, being totally enveloped by it.
Because of the all-pervasive nature of nationalism, explaining it is complicated and much disputed.1 Many attempts have been made to theorize nationalism, to explain its causes, motivations, and nature. These theories and their proponents have been described in considerable detail, for example, by Umut Özkırımlı in his book Theories of Nationalism: A Critical Introduction,2 which gives rather comprehensive coverage of many of the discussions that swirl around the topic in all their intricacies.
So how can we best describe nationalism? To begin, it is an ideology, universally present and suffusing everything, which ordains that every human must belong to one particular nationality, among the many that exist. That nationality must be for its members their main concern, to which they must remain ever loyal, a national grouping defined by claimed territory and an imagined shared heritage (“soil and blood”3). Above all, however, nationality is defined by loyalty to the expression of that grouping actualized in a state, something which all nationalities either have already or else aspire to have.4 Thus, nationalism is an ideology which binds people to a nation-state, so that sincere loyalty to nation, people, and state is a most essential characteristic of it. This loyalty is supposed to be believed in, felt, and expressed by every individual member of the national group through a thoroughgoing, emotional devotion to the nation and its symbols, such as the national anthem and flag. Celebrations and activities built around such symbols help to instill a concept of self-sacrifice in the public and facilitate their mass mobilization; for example, for military service, as in the world wars, when armies of millions of draftees clashed, often futilely.
It is also most remarkable how little nationalism differs from one country to another and thus how undistinctive it is. Sometimes a distinction is made between the fervent nationalism of those supporting a nation-state with such slogans as “My country, right or wrong” and those who merely feel a cultural, linguistic, or geographical affinity with an original homeland. I would maintain that while there are no doubt very different levels of nationalist fervor, ranging from very slight to fully committed all the time, these are simply natural differences of degree that one can find in any adherence to an idea or belief. Everything is suffused with nationalism, we live in it, and we breathe it. It is not possible to completely escape from it nor totally to divest oneself from it. What today are mild nationalist feelings of loyalty or belonging to place may tomorrow be mobilized by a nation-state political system for more totalistic purposes, including but not limited to military service.
A minority of scholars of nationalism have felt that its influence in modern life has been overestimated.5 While I would concede that of course one cannot be preoccupied by nationalism or any other ideology continually day and night, because one has to attend to one’s mundane daily needs, which take up a great deal of time, I do think that the dominance of nationalism as the premier ideology of modernity remains largely unchallenged, because of its subtle intrusiveness everywhere. When one meets strangers in an international setting, or in a situation where there is a doubt about their origin, the normal first question is “Where are you from?” which is meant specifically to determine the questioned one’s national identity. People thus often perform nationalism without even being conscious of what they are doing.
Many writers try to distinguish between a nationalism which they view favorably as being secular and civic, in contrast to a nationalism that they are unfavorable to because it is “religious.” This proposed distinction fits well with secularist, antireligious discourses popular in the so-called West, discourses that depend on constructed dichotomies such as “science good, religion bad” and “secularism good, religion bad.” While I cannot go into the debate over these positions in detail here, the fact remains that all of these categories are heavily disputed: the “West,” science, secularism, and above all religion, so that the distinctions setting them apart collapse; or, put in an alternative way, they are distinctions without a difference. For my purpose here, my assertion is that all nationalisms partake of the same elements, and while their outcomes certainly have differed uncountably, their potentialities are always the same. From this it follows that there is no real distinction to be made between secular and religious nationalism.
How can this be? It is because nationalism, as has been observed by some, is in reality neither a secular ideology nor a material ideology mixed with religion, but a religion itself in its full expression,6 and hence is immediately inimical to traditional religions that existed before modern nationalism came into view in the eighteenth century,7 as well as to all other ideologies, both spiritual and materialist. Nationalism demands a total commitment from a member of the in-group, similar to a religious commitment as traditionally understood. It also demands a more or less exclusive commitment; its bottom line is that dedication to the nation and its state supersedes or trumps all others. While a full-blown nationalist state may go so far as to discourage all manifestations of private religion, many states are simply satisfied with marginalizing traditional religion to the private sphere, as long as it has no effect on the state. Or they try to appropriate the symbols of the prevalent religion as window dressing for the legitimation of the nation-state and of nationalism. But they make no concessions to traditional religion at all, should it shackle or impede the projects of nationalism and its state.
In his foundational work, The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life, Émile Durkheim (1858–1917), a pioneering scholar in modern sociology, shows how religion is a lasting, inescapable characteristic of every society, including modern ones. Thus, he decisively sides with those who believe that religion in some form or other, by its very nature, cannot be superseded. This, despite the common understanding of Durkheim as an icon of the prevalent materialism of our age. For example, Durkheim says,
When a belief is shared unanimously by a people, to touch it—that is, to deny or question it—is forbidden, for the reasons already stated. The prohibition against critique is a prohibition like any other and proves that one is face to face with a sacred thing. Even today, great though the freedom we allow one another may be, it would be tantamount to sacrilege for a man wholly to deny progress or to reject the human ideal to which modern societies are attached.8
In this passage, Durkheim shows that modern ideologies are just as much religion as traditional religions in respect of holding firmly to objects of faith, such as in the example he gives here of belief in “progress,” to the extent that opposing such beliefs in a society, whatever their supposed basis, amounts to sacrilege and apostasy and is severely sanctioned, prohibited, and suppressed, all of which sounds exactly like the supposed religious intolerance usually attributed to traditional religions.
In fact, nationalism is always in its very essence group-specific and therefore exclusionary. To emphasize and back its exclusive nature, and also for its own legitimation, it requires that its followers subscribe to what one may call nationalist logic, which differs from general human logic in its exclusionary properties. In nationalist logic, all that matters is its specific nationalism, its group of members, and its state; all else is excluded from consideration as being either irrelevant or hostile to those interests.9 Every nationalist is expected fully to support the pursuit of only those national interests and to eschew every other consideration. Normal ethical considerations are set aside, as the nationalist cares only for the group and its members. Actions are judged exclusively by whether they benefit the nation and its state or not. Furthermore, nationalism tolerates no opposition; anyone opposed to it is considered an enemy who must be fought against. This is obvious in totalitarian dictatorships but applies as well to states with nominal freedom of speech if they are actually in a war situation, for example. Consequently, nationalism indulges in a very Manichaean view of the world: you are either with us or against us.10 In addition, nationalists will also reject reality if it goes against the beliefs they hold sacred. This rejection of other realities is embodied not only in nationalist myths about the past in which all nationalisms indulge—another sign of how nationalism constitutes or resembles a religion—but also in an outright denial of current realities if they contradict nationalism or its goals.
Sadly, the true character of nationalism has not often been aired by scholars and writers on the subject, either because they are in the service of nationalism and thus must deny its unattractive and unreasonable attributes or because they are so surrounded by its existence that they cannot perceive how it is. But there are fortunately quite a few exceptions as well, starting with George Orwell (d. 1950), who displayed a particularly clear view of nationalism in his 1946 essay “Notes on Nationalism.” After emphasizing the similarity of all nationalisms, despite some differences, he quite baldly states, “The following are the principal characteristics of nationalist thought,” then presents those characteristics under the three subheads of “Obsession,” “Instability,” and “Indifference to Reality.” Under “Obsession,” Orwell describes the bullheaded insistence of nationalists on the sole rightness of their views: “As nearly as possible, no nationalist ever thinks, talks, or writes about anything except the superiority of his own power unit.” Under “Instability,” Orwell questions the fluctuating opinions of nationalists, who nevertheless remain bullheaded in them, as well as the odd tendency of some to also adopt the nationalism of other nationalities, illustrating the falseness of claims of national or ethnic purity. Under “Indifference to Reality,” Orwell traces the refusal of nationalists ever to consider other points of view or to care about others outside of their own groups, and thus to refuse to recognize their common humanity.11
Nationalist logic, thus elaborated by Orwell, goes far in describing the bad conditions and threats, including the threat of nuclear annihilation, that we live under in the world today. By general human logic, one examines all sides of a question from various viewpoints. When investigating history, one needs to go back to as many different and diverse sources as possible to get closer to a historical reality. Under nationalist logic, however, only the interests of the group apply. This reality is brought out most clearly by the ancient Greek historian Thucydides when discussing the revolt and subsequent massacres at Corcyra in 427 BCE, where he traces the same type of partisan devotion to a factional cause as that which Orwell describes over two millennia later. Although describing civil strife in an ancient city-state, Thucydides’s words apply equally well to the logic of nationalism when involved in a conflict or struggle:
To fit in with the change of events, words, too, had to change their usual meanings. What used to be described as a thoughtless act of aggression was now regarded as the courage one would expect to find in a party member; to think of the future and wait was merely another way of saying one was a coward; any idea of moderation was just an attempt to disguise one’s unmanly character; ability to understand a question from all sides meant that one was totally unfitted for action. Fanatical enthusiasm was the mark of a real man, and to plot against an enemy behind his back was perfectly legitimate self-defence. Anyone who held violent opinions could always be trusted, and anyone who objected to them became a suspect.12
While nationalist logic makes sense to the nationalists whose main concern and interest is serving their nation-state or the project of creating such a state, most don’t realize that the nation is then thereby elevated to the status of a deity. According to nationalist logic, everything else must be given up, and nationalists do emphasize making immediate sacrifices for the sake of building up the state and its power. And it is possible that in trying to serve the interests of their state, nationalists succeed in building up their nation-state. After all, the world we live in consists entirely of such states, which control everything politically. Within such a state, despite its totalitarian nature, people might even prosper and flourish. And were it sustainable, which it is not and never can be, one might even suppose that it was better than its alternatives.
Charge of the Lancers, Umberto Boccioni, 1915
But a main problem with the exclusivism of nationalist logic is precisely that by claiming universal superiority it clashes with other nationalisms claiming the same thing, and every people today has its own nationalism, with almost two hundred of them possessing their own nation-states. Many or most of these nation-states have maximalist territorial claims, whether dormant at present or not, and these lead not infrequently to international conflict and are responsible for most of the nasty ethnic struggles over territory that we see in many places today as well as the world wars of the past century. Most such clashes involve the total demonization of the enemy, which means their dehumanization, usually accompanied by blood-curdling calls for the enemy’s complete extermination, sometimes ending in actual massacres, exterminations, and genocides. Such developments are hardly conducive to peaceful living in the world, and even local conflicts over a defined and often rather small territory threaten the overall peace of the world. Without nationalist logic, such conflicts make no sense, for general human concerns and their ethics would then overtake the narrow nationalist ones.
While nationalism is a relatively recent development in the last several centuries of world history, all universalizing creeds necessarily oppose it. For example, Islam stands against it both because of nationalism’s materialist explanation of existence and because of its partiality to particular groups of humans on an ethnic or territorial basis. Of course, there are other materialist ideologies such as Marxism that also have a materialist basis, but their arguments are rather different than those of nationalists, whose position is tribalistic rather than universalist. The Qur’an gives no comfort to any tribalistic, chauvinistic, or particularist claims, in the first place because it is aimed at the entirety of the human race (21:107; 34:28; 49:13). The main verse that mentions nations and tribes (49:13) states that they were created to know one another, completely denying any favor to one over another.13
This Qur’anic principle is further elaborated in the hadith. Śaĥīĥ Muslim reports the Prophet Muhammad ﷺ as having said, “One who is killed under a banner blindly calling for preference for a group (¢aśabiyyah) or supporting preference for a group, his death is that of the Age of Ignorance (al-Jāhiliyyah)”14—that is, he has died outside of the fold of Islam. This clearly shows that Islam cannot be compatible with nationalism. The same point is driven home by Abū Dāwūd’s reporting the Prophet ﷺ to have said, “Whoever calls for group preference does not belong to us, whoever fights for group preference does not belong to us, and whoever dies while supporting group preference does not belong to us,”15 meaning those who follow group preference, and thus nationalism, cannot be Muslims. An even plainer text is found in a report about a sermon of the Prophet ﷺ during his farewell pilgrimage (Ĥijjat al-Wadā¢) of 10/632, in which he is recorded to have said, “There is no preference for an Arab over a non-Arab, nor for a non-Arab over an Arab, nor for a red-colored16 person over a black nor for a black over a red except in piety.”17 This widely acknowledged principle among Muslims strongly contradicts the kind of particularist nationalist claims mentioned by Orwell and noted above.
More generally, Islam, as the religion of tawhid, or monotheism, opposes shirk, meaning partnering other things with God as deities alongside Him (for example, Qur’an 4:36, 48, 116), while nationalism in effect turns the nation or its state into a deity. This concept of the nation-as-divinity is detailed, for example, by Carolyn Marvin and David W. Ingle in their book, Blood Sacrifice and the Nation: Totem Rituals and the American Flag, where they liken the United States to a primitive tribe engaged in blood sacrifice via wars to its tribal totem, which is the American flag. The totem represents the nation, which is the deity of society, with the nationalism that serves the nation being its real dominant religion. The totem also enjoys a monopoly of control over the sacrificial violence in the society of its particular nation-state.18
The idea presented by Marvin and Ingle, that the “civil religion” of the United States constitutes an actual religion, ought seriously to be considered, for sacred rituals surrounding the national flag and anthem are imbued with holiness and power, as one can see from the way they are treated. For example, if we take out a Bible in a public place in the United States, trample it, and stomp on it, at most the reaction of some of the public might be to question why we are doing that. But if we take an American flag, put it on the ground, trample it, and stomp on it, the public reaction would be much more immediate and violent. By this thought experiment, one can see what people really consider holy and what really constitutes sacrilege for them, just as in Durkheim’s example from 1912 cited above that denouncing progress constitutes sacrilege.
In the United States, no expense is spared in putting on nationalist extravaganzas at stadium sporting events, including flyovers by military jets, fireworks, patriotic anthems, and above all a gigantic flag on the field, all of which constitute religious artifacts and rituals, as shown by the veneration offered to them by the public. A dissenter, however, wrote this description:
But at your next sporting event, when the armed forces parade onto the field and they unfurl the gigantic flag, and the masses with worshipful reverence, the only worship most of them will ever know, remove their hats, place their hands over their hearts, and belt out the hymnody of the state as the jets fly over and the fireworks go off... there will be a gray haired overweight man who will not be joining you. That would be me.19
It is very difficult to know how to deal with such extravagant nationalism, which becomes more demanding as time goes on, threatening to make all governments more authoritarian to enforce the nationalist creed and also to lead to more conflicts with other nationalisms, all of which share the same character, differing only in that some have more physical force behind them than others, leading those to be more imperious and aggressive than the others. Some see benefit in the nation-state system, which at least bids to organize societies internally to be at peace, even if in a heavy-handed, regimenting manner. And no doubt even to exist in a world of nation-states, one has to submit to some extent, by in general obeying the laws where one lives, for example.
But it is scarcely possible to submit to all the demands of nationalism. National myths need to be studied and questioned, and when found false, denounced as such, while the bigoted demonization of others has to be rejected out of hand and firmly opposed. Clearly, the refusal to consider other viewpoints or interests forms a major problem with nationalism that allows no easy way to moderation, let alone significant change or reversal. At the same time, however, one has not to fall into the hole nationalists are in by demonizing them in turn. Rather, their humanity has to be recognized and they should be engaged with on a friendly basis whenever possible in the hope at least of dulling their extremism. This is a time-consuming task of individual interpersonal relations, but it is on the whole more likely to bear fruit than other methods of trying to calm the excesses of nationalism. And the stakes could hardly be higher, as narrow-minded nationalism seems hardly to be an ideology that is compatible with a world where technologies of both mass destruction and world unification loom ever more plainly on the future horizon.